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Executive Summary  
 
Its geopolitical relevance secures the Kyrgyz Republic a degree of international 
interest and assistance. Security and prosperity will only emerge, however, if it can 
achieve some independent economic and political strength , beyond present rates of 
growth. The Kyrgyz Republic is confronted with a combination of challenges: 
arbitrarily drawn boundaries; politically and culturally fragile societies; tensions 
between its newly-won sovereignty and the driving force of globalisation; severely 
increasing poverty and inequality; weak implementation capacity at national and local 
level; an unsatisfactory environment for micro, small and medium enterprises; 
growing urban bias; and a lack of rural livelihoods. 
 
Switzerland enjoys a uniquely high profile in the Kyrgyz Republic. The Kyrgyz 
president often takes Switzerland as a model, saying his country should become the 
Switzerland of Central Asia. The pro-poor orientation, pragmatic and sustainable 
approach of Swiss efforts are well known. Contributing three percent of ODA volume 
to Kyrgyzstan, Switzerland is number three among the Republic’s bilateral donors . 
Moreover, in the IMF, the World Bank and the EBRD, the Kyrgyz Republic is member 
of the Swiss-led voting groups. 
 
Interviews revealed different points of view on the extent to which the process to 
prepare the National Poverty Reduction Strategy (NPRS) preparation was 
inclusive. The Government and the multilateral donors are seen as the driving forces, 
with more peripheral roles for smaller donors and civil society and virtual neglect of 
local government and parliament. Ownership of the NPRS is seen to lie with the 
Government but not so much with the country as a whole.  
 
Swiss involvement in the NPRS process can be best described as “business as 
usual”. There has been a limited effort; the menu of options to influence the process 
has not been used for a variety of reasons. Ten key observations can be made:  
 
(1) Mainly because of insufficient prioritisation and very broad formulation of 
policies, a majority of donors does not consider the NPRS as a coordination tool.  
 
(2)  The involvement of donors varies from proactive support to virtual abstention; 
the broad range of instruments used by the active donors presents a wealth of 
experiences for shaping Swiss involvement in the NPRS and its implementation.  
 
(3) Swiss (SDC, seco) HQ do not provide general guidance or country specific 
instructions on the priority of and the involvement in the NPRS process.  
 
(4) Swiss representatives doubt whether adequate resources for active NPRS-
involvement could be mobilised.  
 
(5) Neither Government nor donors try to use the NPRS process for revisiting 
strategic approaches to the reforms in the country. The process of the NPRS could 
become a forum for discussion of alternative development policies.  
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(6) ODA is often tied to specific changes in the policies of the Government; it is an 
ambiguous situation, alsowith regard to the NPRS, that unfulfilled conditionalities are 
renegotiated and the Government is well aware of this flexibility.  
 
(7) To answer the question whether the NPRS paves the way to 
programme/budget support, it has to be noted that so far there is no budget 
transparency in the Kyrgyz Republic.  
 
(8) Often it is unclear whether there are coherent Swiss positions on key NPRS 
issues which are common to all Swiss offices involved. 
 
(9) Channelling the experience of Swiss NGOs into the NPRS process has been 
happening only accidentally.   
 
(10) Looking at the high reputation Switzerland enjoys in the Kyrgyz Republic, it is 
obvious that Switzerland can make a difference in the NPRS implementation. Are the 
means adequate and the political will clear enough to seize this opportunity?    
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1 Introduction  
 
The Kyrgyz case study is part of a larger effort to evaluate SDC’s involvement in 
the processes of developing Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs). The 
PRSP process addresses many issues of concern to SDC. Against that background, 
SDC has commissioned an independent evaluation of its bilateral engagement in 
PRSPs. The independent evaluation is being carried out by Judith Randel and Tony 
German of Development Initiatives (UK) www.devinit.org and Richard Gerster and 
Sonja Zimmerman of Gerster Consulting (Switzerland) www.gersterconsulting.ch. 
The evaluation comprises three major elements: 
· An SDC-wide survey of SDC's experience of PRSPs to date, resulting in 
observations;  
· Case studies in four SDC partner countries (Kyrgyz Republic, Burkina Faso, 
Nicaragua, Vietnam) to look in detail at how SDC, governments, other bilaterals, 
multilateral agencies, NGOs and civil society interact on PRSP processes, 
resulting in observations; 
· A synthesis report, based on the survey and the case studies, analysing the 
findings and making recommendations to SDC on how to improve its role in the 
PRSP processes.  
 
The terms of reference for the overall evaluation are described in SDC’s approach 
paper. Concerning the case studies, the approach paper mentions more specifically: 
· Detailed case studies of SDC engagement in the PRSP process in Nicaragua, 
Vietnam, Burkina Faso and the Kyrgyz Republic consisting of interviews with key 
actors, surveys of processes, interactions, results achieved and lessons drawn, 
based on the key questions. Identification of successes and shortcomings. 
Interpretation of key determinants (analysis), recommendations.  
· Interviews with similar bilateral donor coordination offices (COOFs) in the four 
case study countries to determine what other similar donors are doing. Review of 
readily available information on donor practices in the PRSP context. Comparison 
with SDC activities and recommendations.  
· End-of-Mission Workshop in each country conducted by the evaluator with the 
SDC evaluation officer, COOF staff, government representatives, NGOs, and 
representatives of like-minded donors.  
 
In the case of the Kyrgyz Republic, the execution of the evaluation was entrusted 
to the following international team: 
· Richard Gerster (Switzerland), economist and Director of Gerster Consulting 
(www.gersterconsulting.ch);  
· Roman Mogilevsky (Kyrgyz Republic), Executive Director of the Center for Social 
and Economic Research (CASE) in Kyrgyzstan, Associate Professor at the 
Kyrgyz-Russian-Slavonic University and UNDP-Consultant for the process of the 
National Poverty Reduction Strategy (www.case.elcat.kg).  
  
The methodology for the evaluation in Kyrgyz Republic embraced the following 
steps: 
· The evaluation was prepared by analysis of relevant project documents and 
related studies (see references in Annex 2).  
· The evaluation took place between November 8 and 16, 2002. It consisted of 21 
interviews and consultations with representatives of national government, civil 
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society and donor organisations (see Annex 3). SDC staff were not present during 
the interviews. 
· An end-of-mission workshop took place on November 15, 2002, with a 
presentation of preliminary findings by the evaluators to interview partners, SDC 
staff and other interested participants, providing feedback on the analysis and 
observations brought forward by the evaluation team.  
 
The end-of-mission workshop1 was chaired by a representative of the Office of the 
President, in charge of the PRSP process. Some 20 representatives of Government, 
SDC, other donors and Swiss as well as local NGOs attended (list of participants in 
Annex 4). Not only were the findings of the evaluators part of a joint learning process 
but the methodology and the self-critical attitude of SDC in commissioning such an 
independent evaluation also met with great interest. This effect of the workshop was 
unanticipated. Feedback from the stakeholders ranged from confirmation of the 
findings to slight corrections and provision of additional information and views. Two 
representatives of SDC’s Controlling and Evaluation Division – Christoph Graf, Head; 
and Anne Bichsel, Evaluation Officer – were present during the end-of-mission 
workshop and made an introductory statement on the background of the evaluation 
and a concluding statement on the next steps. 
 
The evaluation team would like to acknowledge the support of SDC Kyrgyzstan in 
making this evaluation a success. In particular, we would like to thank Urs Herren, 
Head of Office, and Vladimir Rakov, National Programme Officer. We express our 
gratitude to our interview partners for their time and the information shared.    
 
 
 
 
2 Context  
 
 
2.1 Kyrgyzstan’s Trends and Challenges 
 
Geography and history 
The Kyrgyz Republic is located in Central Asia and has borders with Kazakhstan, 
Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and China. The country’s population is five million. Its main 
geographical peculiarities are: land-locked location and long distance from the 
international seaports and major economic centres; mountainous terrain (mountains 
occupy about 90% of the country’s territory); and difficulty of communications 
between various parts of the country, in particular the North and the South.  
 
As an independent state, the Kyrgyz Republic emerged in 1991 as a result of the 
collapse of the Soviet Union. From 1924, Kyrgyzstan had the status of national 
autonomy, and from 1936 it became a union republic within the Soviet Union. During 
this time, its autonomous status lost significance; most of the critical decision-making 
and policy formation was done in Moscow.  
 
                                            
1 See also Christoph Graf/Anne Bichsel, Report Back to Office, Berne 26 November 2002 
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Political and social issues 
Kyrgyzstan is a republic headed by a President. The Constitution grants the 
President wide authority, including formation of the government, appointments to the 
higher government positions, appointment of heads of local administrations 
andjudges, representation of the country on the international arena, etc. The country 
has a two-chamber Parliament (Jogorku Kenesh). Both the President and the 
Parliament are elected by universal, direct, equal and secret vote. The most recent 
elections to the Jogorku Kenesh were conducted in February-March, 2000, and 
presidential elections in October 2000. The Government is headed by the Prime 
Minister, who is nominated by the President and approved by the Parliament. The 
Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court are key judicial bodies.  
 
The country needs to change the division of power between the President, the 
Government, the Parliament and to introduce other amendments into its Constitution, 
which probably will be adopted in a nation-wide referendum in 2003. 
 
Territorially, the country is divided into seven oblasts and the capital – Bishkek city. 
Each of these administrative and territorial units has a state administration 
(executive) and a representative body elected by the citizens residing in the 
oblast/city. 
 
Kyrgyzstan citizens enjoy quite a high level of education. Literacy among the adult 
population is 98% and the country has a system of universal free secondary 
education; there is a developed network of universities. However, in recent years, the 
educational system has been suffering from a lack of financial resources and a lack 
of policy orientation in the new environment of transition. 
 
Following the national traditions of the peoples living in Kyrgyzstan and as part of the 
Soviet legacy, the role of women in public life is high. Women have free and equal 
access to education and jobs in public administration. At the same time, however, 
representation of women in the highest bodies of the executive and legislative 
powers is disproportionately low. 
 
Recent years have produced a significant layering of the population in terms of 
income. According to the estimates of National Statistics Committee of the Kyrgyz 
Republic, the Gini coefficient, characterising income inequality, was 0.45 in 2001, up 
from 0.31 in 1989/90.  
 
Economic situation 
On the World Bank’s scale, Kyrgyzstan is in the category of countries with low level 
of income. The GDP per capita was in current USD 270 (2000); and adjusted in 
terms of purchasing power parity (PPP) in 2001 it was USD 2,521. 
 
The main branches of the economy are agriculture, which produces more than one 
third of the country’s GDP and employs a half of its labour force. Industry accounts 
today for about 20% of the GDP and 6% of employment, the country having 
undergone a serious de-industrialisation process during the last decade. The main 
branches of industry are mining, hydro power generation, machine building, light and 
food industry. A significant share of the GDP and employment is generated by trade, 
transportation and non-market services such as education, health, etc.. The country’s 
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economy is quite open: in 2000 the exports of goods and services were about 44% of 
the GDP, and imports  55%. 
 
A serious problem for the economic development of the country is the chronic deficit 
of the government budget that was inherited from the Soviet Union times. In 2000 it 
was over 10% of the GDP. The deficit is mostly covered by loans from international 
financial institutions (World Bank, Asian Development Bank, IMF, and others). As a 
result, the external debt of the country has grown very rapidly and currently is 
significantly higher than 100% of the GDP. The impossibility of its further growth and 
the necessity to serve the debt make the issue of restructuring the whole system of 
government revenues and expenditures very urgent. In 2001, the Government made 
strenuous adjustment efforts, decreasing the deficit to the level of 5% GDP. This was 
done at the expense of major cuts in spending on education and health care as well 
as on the Public Investment Program. This allowed a Poverty Reduction and Growth 
Facility (PRGF) agreement to be concluded with the IMF in December 2001 and 
government debt with the Paris Club to be restructured in March 2002.  
 
In 1996-2001 the country demonstrated rather high economic growth, with the 
average rate above 5% per annum; in 2001-2002 the government managed to halt 
inflation (currently it is 1-2% per year) and stabilise the exchange rate of the national 
currency, the som. However, the macroeconomic situation remains fragile, as 
economic growth depends on on three sectors (gold mining, electricity production, 
agriculture). Because of unfavorable exogenous shocks affecting these sectors the 
GDP growth rate in 2002 would be only slightly above zero. 
 
Major development problems 
The country faces many problems in its development. Poverty is considered as a 
major economic and social problem. While during the last two years some decline in 
poverty rates was registered, in 2001 47.6% of the population still lived below the 
national poverty line. Obviously, poverty has different components: economic, social 
and others. 
 
A big issue in economic development is sustainability of economic growth. Serious 
problems here are: 
¨ Diversification of sources of economic growth, which should make the economy 
less sensitive to numerous external shocks;  
¨ Macroeconomic stability, which is closely related to external debt issues and the 
necessity to increase government revenues and reduce the budget deficit; 
¨ Investment attraction, which assumes considerable improvement of the 
investment climate, removal of barriers to entrepreneurial activities, business 
deregulation etc.; 
¨ Improvement in export opportunities, which should contribute to the country’s 
investment attractiveness and increase the country’s ability to serve its foreign 
debt; 
¨ Structural reforms, which should make the markets in the country function 
properly and ensure sustainability of the energy sector and other production 
infrastructure. 
 
In the social sphere important problems are: 
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¨ Preventing further degradation of social infrastructure (education and health care, 
first of all), without which it is impossible to reproduce and accumulate the human 
capital needed for long-term development; 
¨ Creation of a targeted social safety net, to protect vulnerable social groups from 
poverty. 
 
The above problems can only be successfully dealt with if the country equally 
manages to solve its governance problems, including the development of 
democratic institutions, judicial reforms, decentralisation and prevention of corruption. 
Moreover, aid dependency creates a biased form of accountability: donors’ opinions 
matter more than those of it’s a country’s own (civil) society2. 
 
Another group of problems relates to the regional security and cooperation 
issues. The country is situated in what is commonly perceived as an extremely 
politically vulnerable region. On the other hand, opening up of the regional market, 
internally and externally, is urgently needed. 
 
 
2.2 The PRSP process 
 
The PRSP in the Kyrgyz Republic is called the National Poverty Reduction Strategy 
(NPRS)3. To fully understand the appreciation of the NPRS by Government, civil 
society and donors alike, the major effort by the Kyrgyz authorities4 to create a 
Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF) from 1999 - 2001 has to be 
mentioned. The CDF5 put forward a holistic approach to development, which seeks a 
better balance in policymaking and implementation by highlighting the 
interdependence of all elements of development – social, structural, human, 
governance, environmental, macroeconomic, and financial. This approach requires a 
transition from donor-led development assistance strategies to the development of a 
country strategy led by a country itself, with vigorous participation of government at 
all levels, including representative institutions, civil society and the private sector. In 
the case of Kyrgyz Republic, the CDF process has been very participatory and 
inclusive, as was emphasised by many people interviewed. However, adding up the 
many forthcoming proposals, the consensus-oriented CDF process6 led to a paper 
without priorities. 
 
The preparation of the NPRS started in 2000. The NPRS was developed in parallel to 
the Comprehensive Development Framework, being the country’s long-term strategy 
for 2001-20107. Originally it was intended that the CDF period would include three 
                                            
2 It was mentioned that donors may have access to information which is much more difficult to get for local 
NGOs. 
3  Government of Kyrgyz Republic, National Poverty Reduction Strategy 2003 – 2005. Expanding the Nation’s 
Potential, Bishkek 2002 
4 The Kyrgyz Republic was among a dozen of CDF pilot countries: Bolivia, Côte d’Ivoire, the Dominican 
Republic, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kyrgyz Republic, Morocco, Romania, Uganda, Vietnam, and West 
Bank/Gaza. Later on further non-pilot countries followed. 
5 We follow the description of the World Bank in www.worldbank.org/cdf/cdf-faq.htm   
6 One interviewee noted – despite many differences in the process – fundamental analogies between CDF and 
NPRS, and the Soviet planning efforts.  
7 Government of Kyrgyz Republic, The Comprehensive Development Framework of the Kyrgyz Republic to 
2010. National Strategy, Bishkek 2001 
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consecutive NPRSs for the periods 2001-2004, 2005-2007, 2008-2010, so the 
current NPRS was (and continues to be) considered as the first stage of CDF 
implementation, while the schedule for the NPRS 2003-2005 is obviously different 
now. The CDF and the Interim NPRS (I-NPRS) were completed almost 
simultaneously in May 2001. In June 2001, the I-NPRS was presented to the IMF 
and the World Bank. I-NPRS was used as a background document for concluding the 
Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) agreement with the IMF in December 
2001. 
 
The process of preparation of the full NPRS was long (2001-2002). It is  coordinated 
by the Office of the President. There are 30 working groups for different sectors and 
issues to draft the NPRS. In addition to government officials, members of Parliament, 
representatives of civil society and the private sector were invited to participate in the 
working groups. Donors however, were not usually part of these working groups. In 
August 2002, drafts of major parts of the NPRS were available but without budgets. 
Selected NPRS issues were discussed in seminars, with participation by 
representatives of the government, donors and civil society. While the thematically 
focused working groups usually assembled much of the know-how available in the 
country, it is said that the overall structure putting together the different contributions 
remained rather weak, leading to a draft document of 250 pages. The full draft NPRS 
was completed in September 2002 in Russian. By early October 2002, the 
Government made the entire draft NPRS available in Russian and English. It was 
discussed at the Consultative Group (CG) meeting mid-October 2002. While the 
participants of the CG meeting praised the Kyrgyz Government for its efforts in 
formulating a strategy, the text of NPRS was criticised for the lack of focus, 
prioritisation and costing8. Responding to this critique the government announced its 
intention to revise the draft version in the light of the comments received, to prepare 
a summary of some 40 pages including prioritisation, and invited the donor 
community to comment. The short NPRS version was submitted to the World Bank 
and the IMF, which were to consider them on meetings of their Executive Boards as 
early as January 2003 since the World Bank intends to revise its Country Assistance 
Strategy (CAS) and base it on the NPRS.   
 
Interviews revealed different points of view on the extent to which the process of 
NPRS preparation was inclusive. Opinion ranged from “Government dominating the 
process” to “the Government no longer running the show” as a major innovation. A 
number of key figures from central government and the major donors – the World 
Bank and the IMF, which are seen as main customers of the document – made the 
main input into the process. As already mentioned, involvement of civil society 
organisations was much more modest in comparison to the CDF process, which is 
considered as truly participatory. Few members of parliament attended the working 
groups as the meeting schedules were not harmonised and Parliament did not put 
the NPRS on its agenda, neither in its plenary nor in one of its committees. A few 
written suggestions were submitted by MPs.  Some interviewees criticised the 
process as intransparent and disorganised, mainly due to lack of staff and 
unwillingness to delegate. The evaluators tried to get a detailed picture of the 
process in the sense of when people were consulted but this could not be done in the 
time available. 
 
                                            
8 See chapter 2.3 
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2.3 Key Issues of the NPRS 
 
Integration with the CDF process has implications for the content of the NPRS 
contents. It covers almost all main areas of social, economic and political life of the 
country and does not concentrate on poverty reduction issues – as the title of the 
document suggests – and macroeconomic and budget management, as the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank would like to see it. Basically, 
both the CDF and NPRS address three key priorities: (i) a fair society, free of 
poverty, (ii) good governance, and (iii) sustainable economic growth. The NPRS 
addresses in more detail many of the problems described in chapter 2.1, as well as 
their possible solutions, development of different parts of the country, involvement of 
different players, including civil society, into the NPRS implementation. It also 
contains some ideas on monitoring and evaluation of the NPRS processes and 
results. 
 
There are several key NPRS-related questions deserving more detailed discussion in 
the context of this report. These are: 
 
¨ Ownership of the document. The interviews with government officials have 
displayed their perception of the document as a necessary country management 
tool. The NPRS should provide the government with an internally consistent 
action plan for the next three years. From the point of view of the representative 
of the Ministry of Finance the next NPRS should substitute for the IMF-authored 
PRGF document. In this sense, government ownership of the document is quite 
visible. This is a new phenomenon in Kyrgyzstan because previously developed 
country- or sector-wide strategies were obviously donor-driven and the 
government often did not take seriously those programmes. However, the 
representatives of Parliament and civil society pointed out that the sense of 
country ownership is rather weak. For example, Parliament never had plans to 
discuss the document. Civil society representatives did not feel committed to 
implementing the strategy, considering it a government-donor matter. At the level 
of local government and community, the document was said to be practically 
unknown. 
 
¨ Purpose of the document. While senior government representatives claim that the 
document is intended first and foremost for formation of domestic policies, many 
middle-level government officials and non-government representatives believe 
that the main goal of the NPRS is to satisfy donor requirements and ensure the 
inflow of foreign aid. This belief is grounded in the clear intervention by major 
donors into the NPRS preparation process. The attitude of looking for aid first and 
considering self-help later, is spreading. A Kyrgyz interviewee mentioned as a 
major weakness of the NPRS its reliance on foreign aid instead of a maximum 
mobilisation of national resources. Other see it as a major achievement to have 
an official government-owned and poverty-focused reference document. 
 
¨ Prioritisation. Many representatives of donor organisations, but also some 
government representatives viewed the document as too broad. Of course, the 
country has problems in almost every sphere, but with scarce resources some 
prioritisation is necessary. The NPRS does not provide guidance for either the 
government or the donors in identifying the most important points of intervention 
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during the forthcoming three-year period. The financial gross requirements are 
around USD 2.5 billion. Up to USD 1 billion is supposed to financed by 
Government, leaving a gross gap of USD 1.5 billion. According to the pledging at 
the Consultative Group meeting some USD 0.7 billion are available9 during 2003-
2005. The net resource gap is, therefore, USD 0.8 billion.  
 
¨ Costing of programmes. Another and related problem brought forward by many of 
the interviewees is lack of assessment of costs and benefits associated with 
different NPRS components. In particular, a link between the Medium Term Fiscal 
Framework and the budget, and the NPRS is missing. Poverty alleviation is more 
than a government or aid exercise; the link of the NPRS to the private sector is 
weak. Furthermore, a cost estimate for the Kyrgyz Republic to reach the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDG) in 2015, and its implications for foreign aid 
grants, is not part of the NPRS. Whereas the Ministry of Finance favours clear 
costing, other ministries live well with the present vague situation because they 
have more discretionary room for ad-hoc decisions. Very often this lack of costing 
is also a consequence of insufficient government capacity to estimate accurately 
all programme-related costs.  
 
¨ Lack of capacity. Implementation of the NPRS is not only a question of sufficient 
resources but capacity at all levels. The absorption capacity in government, the 
private sector and civil society is not adequate to deal with the implementation of 
NPRS in an effective and efficient manner. Effectiveness and efficiency in the 
service of poverty reduction can be strengthened a great deal. There are very big 
reserves in efficiency and targeting of existing aid programs. With the expected 
inflow of aid into the country an effective monitoring system is needed, ensuring 
proper use of the aid money and preventing adverse effects on multilateral debt, 
domestic tax effort, transparency of government operations and other problems. If 
this analysis is correct, all programmes – whether government owned or foreign 
financed – should encompass a capacity building component.  
 
¨ NPRS as an instrument for donor coordination. One of the potential functions of 
the NPRS is to be a tool for coordination of donor activities in the country. In 
international comparison, donor coordination in the Kyrgyz Republic is at an early 
stage. There is no systematic reporting10 of financial flows by the donors to the 
government. Improved donor coordination is badly needed because, as a good 
number of interviewees stated, donor aid inconsistencies11 are widespread. In its 
current form, the NPRS leaves room for any activity donors would like to 
implement in the country.  
 
¨ Gap between policies and implementation. On various occasions, the risk of a 
growing gap between the policies laid down in the document and their 
implementation was mentioned. The government has accumulated some 
experience in adopting different sectoral programmes and then neglecting them in 
                                            
9 This figure is indicative and has to be viewed with a lot of caution. It is used for political purposes to 
demonstrate the donors’ support to the Kyrgyz Republic. 
10 Some donors do report their financial flows to the government. This relates, of course, to all grant and loan 
money going directly to the budget. The Swiss coordination office provides this information on request. Some 
donors (USAID, in particular) refuse to disclose their aid flow information, showing just totals (where all 
expenditures on foreign consultants are included). 
11 We found different opinions on how much these inconsistencies include serious overlap. 
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favor of short-term considerations and/or because of poor initial costing and 
consequent lack of funds for implementation. The insufficient prioritisation and 
costing of the NPRS increase the risk of divergence between policy and practice. 
Against this background, monitoring implementation becomes crucial. One of the 
respondents mentioned that goals should be monitored and not merely the output 
of farms and factories as in the former Soviet Union.   
 
 
2.4 Overview of the Donor Community  
 
The Kyrgyz Republic is one of the major recipients of foreign aid in the former Soviet 
Union. From 1992-2000 the country received about USD 1.7 billion, or 370 dollars 
per capita. On average, this is roughly USD 40 per capita/year, equaling some 10% 
of GNP during the nine years in question. The aid consisted of three elements:  
· grants going to the revenue part of the current budget; 
· programme loans used for financing the current budget deficit; 
· investment loans used for the Public Investment Program (PIP – the so-called 
development budget).  
In 2001 these elements accounted for 4%, 6.6% and 21% of the expenditures of the 
general government budget (current budget + PIP); i.e., altogether the aid composed 
31.6% of the government expenditures or 6.6% of GDP. 
 
All donors of Kyrgyzstan may be subdivided into three groups: multilateral 
international organisations, governments of foreign countries and non-governmental 
organisations. In general, multilateral donors provided 65% of total international aid 
resources, governments of foreign countries 29%, and non-governmental 
organisations 6%. For a detailed overview on multilateral and bilateral donors consult 
Annex 5. 
 
The most important (both in terms of the aid amounts and political influence) 
multilateral donors are the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, and the 
International Monetary Fund. EBRD, EU, UNDP and other UN agencies are also 
active in Kyrgyzstan. There is a special donor situation in the Kyrgyz Republic. 
Among the bilaterals, Japan and the United States are by far the largest donors in 
volume. Switzerland, Germany and the United Kingdom follow. The most active 
international NGO is George Soros’s Open Society Institute. 
 
Good informal contacts among the rather small donor community prevail. In some 
areas there are ad-hoc coalitions of cooperation. After the CG meeting efforts were 
started to explore a stronger and more formal cooperation among bilateral donors. 
 
  
2.5 The Cooperation Programme Switzerland – Kyrgyz Republic  
 
The Swiss Cooperation Programme in the Kyrgyz Republic is a joint effort and an 
umbrella for the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC), the State 
Secretariat for Economic Affairs (seco) and the Political Affairs Division IV of the 
Department of Foreign Affairs (PD IV). 
 
As mentioned in the previous section, Switzerland is a significant donor in 
Kyrgyzstan. Since 1992, it granted about USD 80 million to Kyrgyzstan. Overall, 
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Switzerland is the fourth largest bilateral donor to the region of Central Asia after 
Japan, the United States and Germany. In Kyrgyzstan Switzerland is even number 
three but a large difference to the leader Japan and the U.S has to be taken into 
account. Looking at the total of bilateral and multilateral ODA in the year 2000, 
Switzerland had a share of 3%. As Swiss aid is usually offered as grants, it is 
particularly attractive to the indebted Kyrgyz Republic. For detailed information 
regarding Swiss ODA to the Kyrgyz Republic, see Annex 6. 
 
Swiss support is directed to different sectors. The most important are energy 
production, agriculture and forestry, health care, development of mountainous areas, 
SME development and foreign trade promotion. SDC provides an economic advisor 
to the President. Switzerland also provided grant money for budget support of 
targeted social assistance within the framework of the World Bank’s structural 
adjustment credits. While acknowledging the substantial Swiss contribution, several 
interviewees mentioned key issues from a Kyrgyz perspective which match key 
Swiss competences: Finance, including the banking system, food processing, 
federalism and decentralisation, hydropower, tourism, mountain development. 
 
Many projects funded by the Swiss government are implemented in Kyrgyzstan 
through Swiss NGOs, of which the largest and best known in the country is Helvetas, 
which has its own support programme. Other Swiss NGOs are Intercooperation, the 
Swiss Red Cross, the Centre for Development and Environment (CDE) of the 
University of Berne, and Caritas Switzerland. 
 
 
 
3 Mapping Swiss Involvement in the PRSP-Process  
 
 
3.1 Motivation 
 
A primary motivation for Swiss involvement is the obvious fact that the NPRS is 
covering most of the key issues of the Swiss cooperation programme with the Kyrgyz 
Republic. It has to be noted, however, that when Switzerland started the cooperation 
with transition countries, the facilitation of democratic and economic transition rather 
than the alleviation of poverty had been a primary concern. Now poverty reduction 
figures among the overall goals of the new Regional Mid-Term Program (RMTP) 
2002 – 2006.  
 
The Kyrgyz Republic is a member – as are Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan 
– of the Swiss-led voting group in the Bretton Woods Institutions (International 
Monetary Fund, World Bank Group). Likewise, in the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) Switzerland leads a constituency including 
the Kyrgyz Republic, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. The Swiss RMTP for 2002 – 
2006 states: “Their joining Swiss led constituencies was associated with the belief 
and expectation that Switzerland as a small, landlocked and neutral country but well 
integrated into the world economy would be a particularly relevant and reliable 
partner to support their political and economic transition. Switzerland shares the 
political responsibility to support and assist these countries.“ This basic motivation is 
also valid when dealing with the NPRS. 
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3.2 Activities & instruments 
 
Sources of information   
SDC staff dealing with NPRS issues used the locally available documents of the 
CDF, the I-NPRS, some draft chapters of the NPRS, and finally the draft NPRS. A 
major source of information was the programme experience, discussions with the 
Government, with other donors and third parties. The basic brochure produced by 
seco and SDC on PRSPs is known. Overall assessments of PRSPs by the World 
Bank, international NGOs or reports from the South have not been “digested”. The 
Vietnam experience of the present head of the SDC office, however, is an important 
asset of process experience. 
 
Dialogue 
There are different forms of dialogue which matter in relation to the NPRS: 
· Switzerland actively participated in the preparation and the meeting of the 
Consultative Group in October 2002, which served as the primary platform to 
exchange views on the NPRS; it delivered a presentation12 of the donors’ position 
on Social Protection and Human Development; 
· SDC participated in more or less regular government/donor meetings, which were 
more frequent during the CDF/NPRS processes. They mainly served as a 
platform to exchange information;  
· Occasionally, SDC participated in NPRS-related meetings, like the NPRS “Energy 
working group” meeting; 
· SDC participated in regular sector coordination meetings between donors, 
multilaterals and government on health, SMEs – including framework conditions 
such as investment climate – agriculture and forestry; 
· On the occasion of high-level mission visits, there was a high-level (seco and/or 
political level) and informal policy dialogue between Switzerland and the Kyrgyz 
government concerning macroeconomics, energy, health and the agricultural 
sector but not explicitly NPRS-related; 
· SDC is involved in a working dialogue with the World Bank due to joint projects13, 
in particular on the occasion of the annual review and planning; 
· Due to operational cooperation, SDC is in a working dialogue with USAID in 
agricultural sector and SMEs;  
· Usually, before SDC’s annual programming, an annual dialogue between 
Switzerland and the Government takes place. The government chooses the 
representatives from its side. SDC can comment on observations and plans. 
Concrete points regarding the PRSP could be integrated. This dialogue is very 
open and comments are being received positively. In 2002, however, it was 
omitted due to the coincidence with the CG meeting and high-level visits. 
· The Swiss special advisor to the President usually meets twice a year with the 
President of the Kyrgyz Republic. So far, however, the NPRS has not been on 
their agenda. 
 
                                            
12 See below chapter 3.5 
13 Cofinancing of the Consolidated Structural Adjustment Credit; joint implementation Helvetas/Worldbank and 
joint funding SDC/IFAD of the Rural Advisory Service (RAS); experiences of the Kyrgyz-Swiss Health Reform 
Project in Naryn Oblast (implemented by the Swiss Red Cross, funded by SDC) will be taken up by the Health 
loan programme of the World Bank; the IFC Central Asia Partnership which is financed by seco; the seco funded 
cadastre project which again is closely linked to what the World Bank is doing in land registration.  
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Funding 
· Switzerland funded the Consultative Group meeting in October 2002, the first CG 
meeting since 1999, also the first one which was prepared by the country’s 
authorities and which took place in the Kyrgyz Republic.  
 
 
3.3 The Washington connection 
 
The fact that the Kyrgyz Republic is a member of the Swiss-led voting group in the 
IMF, the World Bank and the EBRD was frequently mentioned as a special 
relationship. Obviously, there are frequent formal and informal interactions using 
personal contacts to Washington and Berne. To the extent that Switzerland sponsors 
trust funds at the World Bank14 which are related to poverty reduction, it is of 
importance to the COOF to have adequate information on the opportunities for the 
Kyrgyz programmes and to know how decisions are taken.  
 
SDC Bishkek provides, on important occasions, inputs to the coordinating agency 
(seco) in Berne regarding the World Bank or the Ministry of Finance in Berne 
concerning the IMF. This may be the case for the Swiss comments on the NPRS 
early 2003. They use it as raw material to prepare the official Swiss input to the 
Executive Director. The EDs have a margin of manoeuvre to deal with potentially 
differing concerns of the Kyrgyz Republic in their voting group by referring in their 
statements specifically to opinions held by the Kyrgyz Government. It is not possible, 
however, to split the votes and to cast the Kyrgyz voting share – or those of other 
voting group members – in a different way than the dominating Swiss opinion.  
 
 
3.4 Extent of Involvement 
 
The reasons given by SDC staff for not commenting on the partial drafts in 
August/September 2002 included: 
· Many staff are absent during July and August; 
· A very short time slot was available to contribute; 
· All the messages had already passed through other channels or fora; 
· SDC does not have to duplicate what other donors are contributing; 
· Respect for Government ownership of the process; 
· Low expectations of the process. 
 
It was said that overall there was a rather weak involvement of many donors due to 
the short time span between the availability of a draft and the deadlines for 
comments. On at least two occasions the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic is said 
to have given SDC two days only to comment and even stated that there was no 
room for major changes. “This was indeed very discouraging as we felt [we were] to 
be consulted only as part of a formality”15.  
 
Apart from the written input to the CG meeting16, no other SDC documents related to 
the NPRS could be traced.  
                                            
14 SDC is working on a new strategy in view of a “Learning Partnership Trust Fund“; moreover, SDC contributes 
to a PRSP trust fund of the World Bank. 
15 Statement SDC staff 
16 See below chapter 3.6 
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On the occasion of the CG meeting the Government invited the donors to submit 
written comments on the NPRS, not later than mid-November 2002. Some SDC-
related inputs were passed on. The process, however, was again not perceived as 
really being open to comment. The same reasons for abstention as in 
August/September applied with the exception of physical absence of staff.  
 
Whereas SDC had intensively followed the CDF process in 2000 and 2001, providing 
inputs, participating in meetings, etc., in 2002 an attitude of “business as usual” was 
adopted, reflecting the perception of the overall NPRS process and the internal 
resource constraints.  
  
 
3.5 Content of interventions 
 
On the occasion of the Consultative Group Meeting in October 2002, Switzerland 
made a presentation17 on “Social Protection and Human Development” on behalf 
of the donors, complementing the Government’s view. Switzerland stated that 
“macroeconomic stabilisation has also been reached by a significant curtailing of 
social sector expenditure18 as percentage of GDP. This trend has created a broad 
range of problems in the social protection, education and health sectors, which are all 
very clearly and frankly analysed in the NPRS”. It goes on to stress that under these 
circumstances a “much better targeting of available resources” is required to protect 
the most vulnerable groups, and that ensuring “access to good quality educational 
and health services and to safe drinking water depends on the implementation of 
rigorous sector reform strategies”. Moreover, “progress in the social sector as 
foreseen in the NPRS in turn depends on drastic reform steps in other key areas, 
such as revenue collection, budget procedures or public service employment 
policies.” 
 
More specifically, since the mid-1990s there has been “a shift from direct social 
spending to implicit social subsidies in the form of low-priced tariffs for services. … 
We are convinced that implicit subsidies are untargeted, inefficient and costly, and 
ultimately unsocial”. Switzerland acknowledges that this problem is “well recognised 
in the NPRS”, endorses policies towards direct social spending including the 
adoption of the draft “Law on State Benefits”, beneficiary assessments19 involving 
non-governmental institutions, timely and in-cash payments of social benefits, and 
finally it notes that “additional donor funding also needs to be mobilized”. 
 
“Spending for education has reached a critically low level, also in international 
comparison”. On the one hand the “NPRS recognizes the need for action and 
proposes a broad range of measures”. On the other hand, Switzerland sees the 
“need to formulate a comprehensive Education Sector Strategy”. Unlike for health the 
NPRS does not mention a target budget for education. An assessment of 
                                            
17 All subsequent quotations are taken of the Swiss speaking notes and presentation.  
18 It should be noted that “IMF programs do not include any ceiling on social spending. To the contrary, under 
the PRGF program it is a requirement that social spending is a priority, and that its share in total expenditures 
increase.” Excerpt of a note by the IMF’s Resident Representative in the Kyrgyz Republic of 15 November 
2002. 
19 Together with the World Bank, Switzerland has initiated an independent pilot beneficiary assessment of the 
Unified Monthly Benefit, the socially protected prices and the housing allowance systems.  
 19 
rehabilitation needs, review of teacher salaries, and gearing curricula to vocational 
education are considered important measures.  
 
“The NPRS correctly identifies the problems and foresees increased public spending 
on health care”. To deepen the on-going health reform process, Switzerland 
recommended addressing the “consolidation of the co-payment system nationwide”, 
“strengthening the Mandatory Health Insurance Fund (MHIF)”, “expanding 
investment in preventive health care”, and linking rehabilitation with “funding for 
sustained operation and maintenance”.  
 
Access to safe drinking water is still a widespread problem, especially for the poor. 
“In the NPRS the provision of safe drinking water is mainly addressed as an 
environmental issue but would deserve a more full treatment and a clear reflection in 
the plans for public spending”. There should be a debate on the role of the state, 
private institutions and the consumer, and the necessary means for rehabilitation, 
operation and maintenance should be allocated.”  
 
In the interview with the representative of the Ministry of Agriculture, it was 
mentioned that a Helvetas staff member was invited to the working group on 
agriculture. He participated and provided valuable analysis and material on their 
experience in agriculture which was partially used to draft the agricultural part of the 
NPRS.   
 
In a programmatic way the RMTP 2002 – 2006 states “Switzerland will support the 
mainstreaming of gender equity issues in the development of PRSPs and related 
poverty assessments, and promote gender budget analysis where necessary.“ So far 
gender has not (yet) been an issue of particular relevance in Swiss NPRS-related 
interventions. 
 
 
 
4 Effects of Swiss Interventions  
 
 
4.1 Effects on the PRSP contents 
 
The general problem of attribution has to be mentioned first. Usually there are 
numerous comments going into the same direction. In a world of cooperation it is the 
exception and not the rule that a specific change can be attributed to a specific actor 
such as Switzerland. 
 
Looking at the Swiss interventions, we characterised them overall “business as 
usual”. Limited efforts, however, lead also to a limited direct influence in the NPRS 
process. Inputs into the on-going sector dialogues probably are partially mirrored in 
NPRS. 
 
 
4.2 Effects on the PRSP process 
 
The grant for the CG meeting made a large platform for an exchange of views on the 
draft NPRS possible and as such strengthened the process. 
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4.3 Repercussions on the Swiss Cooperation Programme  
 
The Swiss Regional Mid-Term Programme (RMTP) 2002-2006 states: “Cooperation 
and coordination with other donors is a necessity to increase the effectiveness of 
Swiss interventions. The Swiss programme is developed in coordination with the 
Government’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP), the World Bank's 
Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF), and its Country Assistance 
Strategies (CAS)”. And: The Kyrgyz Republic is “in the process of elaborating 
Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP), having an Interim PRSP already. As 
PRSPs are supposed to be based on a participative political process, they provide an 
opportunity to improve donor coordination based on a pro poor strategy document 
owned by the partner government. Switzerland will examine how participatory the 
process has been and how the Swiss support can be brought in line with the 
PRSPs”. This is yet to be done. 
 
We did not find a donor representative, either bilateral or multilateral, stating that the 
Interim-NPRS of May 2001 had been of practical relevance to the cooperation 
programme with the Kyrgyz Republic. Similarly, for SDC there are no repercussions 
whatsoever to be reported.  
 
In the Swiss-Kyrgyz Annual Programme 2003 the NPRS is mentioned as an 
overriding process but more concretely it had no impact on either the priorities or the 
budget. It is envisaged that due to the NPRS, costs for coordination and policy 
dialogue may be higher 2003. COOF is currently looking for additional financial 
means to support the newly launched donor coordination initiative. E.g. part of the 
grant provided by SDC for the CG meeting was not used and could be allocated for 
these purposes. 
 
No changes in the Swiss cooperation programme are to be expected; the main 
reason being (1) it now addresses poverty issues, (2) the weak focus of the NPRS. 
However, the Swiss operational grassroots approach will be key for NPRS 
implementation, due to the outstanding quality of operations – working with people, 
long term commitment – which offers a basis for replicating positive experiences of a 
small donor in NPRS implementation. 
 
 
 
 
5 Activities of other donors 
 
Department for International Development (DFID): The corporate DFID strategy 
requires special attention to PRSPs and deals with them as a priority concern. There 
are, however, no specific instructions from Headquarters how to become involved 
into the process as DFID wants to make sure that the NPRS is country driven and 
owned. DFID provided in Kyrgyzstan unfocused support to the process in the form of 
a consultant for 45 days. DFID’s operational priorities in the Kyrgyz Republic are 
health, rural environment and governance – all three areas are considered to be 
compatible with the NPRS so no changes of the DFID programme are envisaged. 
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United States Agency for International Development (USAID): There are no 
directives from headquarters on how to deal with PRSPs. USAID provided extensive 
comments on the October draft version. The adjustment of USAID priorities due to 
the NPRS will be considered as many USAID supported programmes lie in NPRS 
priority areas and are expected to be affected.  
 
German Technical Cooperation (GTZ): GTZ activities are strongly focused on 
economic reform and private sector development. It has Resident Representative in 
the country but GTZ is an implementing agency and not a policy making body. In its 
ongoing working contacts related to the priority areas some of its experiences have 
been transmitted to Government. Beyond the current contacts GTZ abstained from  
participating in the NPRS process, nor did the BMZ, representing Germany in the CG 
meeting, provide written comments on the draft NPRS.  
 
Norway: Norway, hardly present in the Kyrgyz context, supported through its 
Norwegian trust fund at the World Bank the World Bank Report “Kyrgyz Republic. 
Enhancing Pro-poor Growth”20. The explicit goal of this report was to assist the 
Kyrgyz authorities in designing their NPRS. 
 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP): For UNDP PRSPs are a 
corporate priority in view of proactive policy making. UNDP focuses its support on its 
human development concerns, being convinced that these are preconditions for any 
other achievements. In the Kyrgyz Republic, UNDP had been actively involved in the 
CDF, the I-NPRS as well as recently in the NPRS, in close cooperation with the 
leading office of the Government. UNDP is very satisfied with the effectiveness of its 
interventions. In particular, it claims that, due to its activities, the inequality issue and 
gender aspects are now part of the draft. In the NPRS process, UNDP used the 
following instruments: 
· It organised workshops and seminars on NPRS relevant issues; for example a 
gender workshop with members of all working groups participating lead to 
mainstreaming of gender in all domains; 
· UNDP recruited four consultants to strengthen the NPRS process, two of them 
national experts as members of working groups, and two international 
consultants; 
· UNDP prepared an assessment of the NPRS draft of mid-September; 
· UNDP provided a research report authored by a group of national and 
international experts on Macroeconomics and Poverty in support of the working 
group drafting the relevant chapter of the NPRS; 
· UNDP is preparing a field study collecting voices from people living in poverty on 
the NPRS draft, working through its on-going programmes. 
 
 
 
6 Concluding Observations   
 
The above discussion supports the following observations related to the PRSP 
process in Kyrgyzstan and current/future SDC involvement in it: 
 
                                            
20 World Bank, Kyrgyz Republic. Enhancing Pro-poor Growth, Report No. 24638-KG, Washington August 23, 
2002 
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· Majority of donors do not see NPRS as a coordination tool. Because of 
insufficient prioritisation and very broad formulation of policies, the NPRS allows 
each donor to consider its own priorities as those of the country and its own 
approaches as fully matching the policy of the Government. So, at least from the 
donors’ point of view, the NPRS in its current form does not solve the problems of 
donor duplication, overlapping and inconsistency. In a sense this situation is 
convenient for donors, because the NPRS does not require changes to their usual 
practices. Demands for coordination through the NPRS by donors are based on 
the assumption that their own priorities, of course, will be reflected in the strategy. 
It remains to be seen whether the donors are prepared to adjust their programmes 
in the event that the Government does set strict priorities, leaving less room for 
donors’ manoeuvres. In fact, many government representatives stressed that the 
Government faces a dilemma: to improve coordination and at the same time to 
prevent possible conflicts with donors related to the necessity to adjust their 
programmes. Realistically speaking and taking into account the degree of aid 
dependency of the country, the potential for the Government to maintain a very 
strong position in donor relations is limited. Another problem of prioritisation is the 
donors’ demand – and the Government’s readiness – to make the NPRS process 
inclusive of civil society. However, the dialogue between the Government and civil 
society could be meaningful only if the Government was prepared to 
accommodate at least some part of the civil society’s concerns. This, of course, 
necessarily broadens the country’s reform agenda and makes the list of priorities 
even longer. 
 
· Involvement of donors varies from proactive support to virtual abstention. 
Different donors have different approaches to the NPRS. The largest ones – the 
World Bank and the IMF – initiated this process and are deeply involved in it 
(organising seminars, providing consultants and background materials, 
extensively commenting on the document drafts at all stages, etc.). Some other 
donors (for example, ADB, UNDP) are also pretty much involved, considering the 
process an opportunity to ensure representation of their own agenda in the 
country strategic document. Some bilaterals also contribute to the process, 
providing advisory services and actively participating in the document discussion. 
Finally there is a group of donors (both multilateral and bilateral), who are not 
directly involved in the NPRS process but who are influencing the policy formation 
mainly on a sectoral level. The broad range of instruments21 used by the active 
donors present a wealth of interesting experiences for shaping the Swiss 
involvement in the NPRS and its implementation.  
 
· No guidance from SDC HQ on priority & involvement in the NPRS process. So far 
the Headquarters of SDC neither provided its country offices in general with 
guidance on corporate policy on priority and involvement in the NPRS process nor 
gave any specific instructions to its representation in the Kyrgyz Republic. The 
latter is not astonishing as SDC is highly decentralised. This leaves the SDC 
country office in perhaps a comfortable but also an unclear position. 
 
· Doubts whether adequate resources for active NPRS-involvement can be 
mobilised. Keeping in mind that resources are necessary for effective 
interventions in the NPRS process, it may be significant that SDC does not 
                                            
21 See chapter 5. 
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dispose of earmarked budgets for research, meetings or other activities in the 
framework of PRSP processes. More generally, the different behaviour of donors 
may also reflect the availability of resources allocated for these purposes. 
Success or failure in mobilising them may demonstrate diverse donors’ perception 
of the PRSP process in general. It was suggested that SDC’s future involvement 
in the PRSP process in the Kyrgyz Republic (and eventually other countries) 
could become a specially designed project with its own programme and budget. 
 
· Neither Government nor donors try to use the NPRS process for revisiting 
strategic approaches to the reforms in the country. Reform in Kyrgyzstan to a 
large extent follows the standard recipes of the World Bank and the IMF22. The 
process of preparation of the NPRS could become a forum for discussion of 
alternative development policies. This has not happened so far23 despite the 
international experience that orthodox economics have been a mixed blessing for 
a good number of developing countries24. The IMF-led stabilisation policy of the 
Kyrgyz Republic requires a ceiling for public investment in 2005 of 3% of GDP 
borrowing (not grants) with implications for growth and poverty. The summary 
version of the NPRS, dating November 2002, surprisingly mentions 4% as a 
ceiling. The 1% difference is projected to correspond to USD 15 – 20 million in 
2005. It is said this significant change was mainly the result of a debate between 
the IMF and the large creditors in Kyrgyz Republic, the World Bank and the Asian 
Development Bank25. Do Government and bilateral donors – in particular 
Switzerland – have the political will and the analytical capacity to question for 
example key figures and reform measures of the IMF led stabilisation 
path?26Ambiguity concerning aid conditionalities will impact on the NPRS. An 
unresolved issue in current aid practices is the provision of aid tied to the 
fulfillment of specific changes in the policies of the recipient Government. It may 
occur that the Government cannot or does not wish to fulfill imposed conditions. In 
co-financing the World Bank’s structural adjustment credit (CSAC)27 Switzerland 
is directly aligned to the conditionality of the Bretton Woods Institutions, thus 
losing its autonomy in policy dialogue and aid disbursements. Despite frequent 
interruptions and power play, the aid flows are not fundamentally disrupted 
because overall the reform policies of the Kyrgyz Republic enjoy a reasonable 
                                            
22 According to an expert on macroeconomics, the present austerity policies followed in the Kyrgyz Republic run 
against economic growth and poverty reduction. An obvious symptom that basic issues are wrong, he said, are 
real interest rates around 35% which entirely discourage local investment and job creation on a profitable basis. 
But also the World Bank is said to have followed in early reform phases ideological paths in destroying 
collective farms and rural credit facilities despite the lack of  viable alternatives. “It is up to bilateral donors to 
challenge dogmatic attitudes of the IMF and the World Bank”.   
23 The IMF Resident Representative mentioned that the introduction of the 3% ceiling in the Public Investment 
Program (PIP) was not accepted without challenge and hotly debated for a considerable period of time. Mainly 
the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank as interested creditors participated in that debate. Swiss 
interventions are not known. 
24 See e.g. Wilks Alex/Lefrançois Fabien, Blinding with Science or Encouraging Debate? How World Bank 
Analysis Determines PRSP Policies, Bretton Woods Project & World Vision International  2002 
25 The Kyrgyz Government was said to have been split over the issue. Whereas the Ministry of Finance favours a 
large PIP reduction, the line ministries prefer a higher ceiling to have more investment opportunities.   
26 Interestingly, the IMF and the World Bank criticize themselves in their latest report to the Development 
Committee “Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) – Progress in Implementation” (DC2002-0016 of 
September 13, 2002) the very limited discussion of the macroeconomic framework and of alternative policy 
options (pp. 17-22) in view of the often overoptimistic assumptions of full implementation of key reforms. It is 
“desirable for countries to incorporate alternative scenarios and contingency plans in their PRSP at the outset” 
(p.20).   
27 See below footnote 24. 
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reputation and there are adjustments if conditions are not fulfilled. In Central Asia 
the Kyrgyz Republic is a political ally in the struggle against terrorism. The 
Government as well as the donors are well aware of this situation which makes 
the very idea of aid-related conditionality questionable and also affects the 
perception of the NPRS.  
 
· Switzerland has a special reputation in the Kyrgyz Republic. The President looks 
at Switzerland as a model for his country and advocates the idea of the Kyrgyz 
Republic as the “Switzerland” of Central Asia. This special situation of Switzerland 
being the “donor darling” may have its risks but implies also opportunities. On the 
one hand there is the risk that SDC is too close to the Government, lacks courage 
and no longer says anything critical. On the other hand, such a basically positive 
attitude may facilitate the scaling up of local pilot programmes to the national 
level, an option which is rare for a small donor. It was said that in relation to 
poverty the SDC advantages are a long history of cooperation, high credibility, 
grants instead of loans or technical assistance, no hidden agenda, since there are 
no political or economic interests. A large donor would welcome a more prominent 
role of Switzerland, feeding all the grassroot experience into the national 
channels. In other words: SDC can make a difference in the NPRS 
implementation. Are the means adequate and the political will clear enough to 
seize this opportunity?    
 
· Programme/budget support or project operations: There is no budget 
transparency yet in the Kyrgyz Republic which is required to really value the 
NPRS. The Public Expenditure Review (PER) covers only the Public Investment 
Program (PIP) which is largely donor-financed anyway. The remaining parts of the 
Government’s budget are not transparent, however. It is striking that the weak 
involvement of parliament in the NPRS is not raised in a more serious way by 
multilateral as well as bilateral donors despite their emphasising the need to link 
the NPRS to the medium-term budgetary framework. Obviously, preconditions do 
not (yet) prevail that would allow the final step towards general budget support28. 
There are limited ad-hoc trends towards closer collaboration among donors, 
including the World Bank, for programme implementation. 
 
· Coherent Swiss position: COOF Bishkek asked the question whom are we 
representing? Is there a consistent opinion held by all offices involved? The 
difficult and politically delicate situation about CSAC conditionality (electricity tariff 
increases, privatisation issues) is of importance for the overall Swiss supported 
programme and its perception among the Kyrgyz partners. The feedback loops 
and cooperation (pursuit of a common policy/strategy) between the Swiss ED's 
Office in Washington, seco, SDC’s geographical and BWI Divisions, the COOF 
and the diplomatic Departments in EDA should be examined29. 
 
                                            
28 Switzerland (seco) co-finances the Consolidated Structural Adjustment Credit (CSAC) of the World 
Bank/IDA (see Annex 6 and the IDS-evaluation by Rachel Sabates-Wheeler, 2002). CSAC is a big step towards 
general budget support but focuses on structural reforms in the energy sector, including a trust fund allocation to 
protect the poor of energy price increases. The IDS evaluation proposes replacing a multilateral co-financing 
arrangement with a bilateral one, leading to higher visibility and influence as well as disconnecting the Swiss 
voice from the more political orientation of the World Bank. 
29 One of the conclusions in Christoph Graf/Anne Bichsel’s Back to Office Report 
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· Channelling the experience of Swiss NGOs into the NPRS process: Agriculture 
and SMEs Helvetas, Health Swiss Red Cross, SMEs Intercooperation, mountain 
development CDE/University of Berne policy dialogue. SDC is in close contact 
with its implementing NGOs and has a dialogue with project staff. When policy 
issues are concerned and discussed with Government, SDC becomes involved. 
At least some of the implementing NGOs (Helvetas) would be interested to be 
more directly involved in the dialogue with Government and the NPRS process. 
Complementing a stronger experience feedback relationship, it was also 
suggested that Swiss NGOs could consider cooperation with one or several 
national NGOs, to share the experience gained with them and to encourage their 
direct interventions in the NPRS process. In such a way, knowledge transfer 
becomes a capacity building exercise.    
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CAS Country Assistance Strategy 
CDE Centre for Science and Environment  
CDF Comprehensive Development Framework 
COOF Coordination Office 
  
DFID Department for International Development 
ED Executive Directors 
GTZ   German Technical Cooperation 
IDA International Development Association 
IFI International Financial Institutions 
IMF International Monetary Fund 
I-NPRS Interim National Poverty Reduction Strategy 
I-PRSP Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 
NGO Non-governmental Organisation 
NPRS National Poverty Reduction Strategy 
PER Public Expenditure Review 
PIP Public Investment Program 
PRSP Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 
RMTP Regional Mid-Term Program 
SDC Swiss Agency for Development Cooperation 
seco State Secretariat for Economic Affairs 
SWAP Sector Wide Approach 
TOR Terms of Reference 
UNDP United Nations Development Program 
USAID United States Agency for International Development  
WB World Bank 
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Cupik Alfred     TACIS, Resident Representative 
 
Doran Eamon   USAID, Private Sector Advisor 
 
Fellmann Felix Swiss Development Cooperation, Programme 
Officer 
 
Fueg Karin    Helvetas, Programme Director 
 
Herren Urs    Swiss Development Cooperation, Coordinator 
 
Isaev Nurkaly   DFID, Resident Representative 
 
Kaeser Daniel   Advisor 
 
Kadyrbekovich Salih Murzaev Academy of Management, Docent 
 
Kanimetov Kubat  Head of Economic Policy Department, 
Administration of the President of the KR 
 
Kasybekov Erkin   Counterpart Consortium, Director 
 
Mudahar Mohinder S.  World Bank, Resident Representative 
 
Mukanbetova Aikan  UNDP, Programme Analyst 
  
Mukhopadhyay Bhaswar  IMF, Resident Representative 
 
Rakov Vladimir Swiss Development Cooperation, National 
Programme Officer 
 
Roesler Ulrike   GTZ, Representative & Project Manager 
 
Sultanov Marat   Deputy of Jogorku Kenesh 
 
Toromyrzaev Emirlan T.  Ministry of Finance, First Deputy Minister 
 
Tynaev Sabyrbek Head of Economic Policy and International Affairs 
Department, Ministry of Agriculture, Water 
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Annex 4 
 
End-of-mission Workshop: List of participants 
Venue: “Pinara” Hotel, Bishkek, November 15, 2002 
Name Organization Position Contact information 
Vladimir Rakov Swiss Coop. Office N.P. Officer vladimir@swisscoop.kg, 666480 
Asel 
Usekeyeva 
Swiss Coop. Office Program Officer asel@swisscoop.kg  
Irina Yunusova Kyrg-Swiss Forestry 
Program 
Program Officer irina@lesic.elcat.kg, 679634 
Eugene 
Ryazanov 
Helvetas Project Leader ksapspi@helvatas.kg, 224637 
Hanspetei Rikli Helvetas Consultant hpr@comch.ru  
Bakyt 
Dubashev 
IMF office economist bdubashev@imf.org 
Hans Bederski Save the Children UK Program 
Manager 
hbaederski@scuk.kg  
Aikan 
Mukanbetova 
UNDP Program Officer ma@undp.kg, 611213 
Urs Herren Swiss Coop Office Coordinator urs.herreu@swisscoop.kg  
Azamat 
Dikambaev  
Office of the President Deputy head adikambaev@mail.gov.kg  
Elena 
Baranova 
Ministry of agriculture Expert  225460 
Bermet 
Muratalieva  
“Interbilim” NGO Consultant 660516, ccpub@infotel.kg  
Dinara 
Makesheva 
Institute for War and 
Peace Reporting 
 600342 
Almazbek 
Jakypov 
Secretariat of the 
Special representative 
of the President on the 
investment attraction 
  
Ulrike Roesler German Technical 
Cooperation (GTZ) 
GTZ 
representative & 
Project Manager  
 
 Department for 
International 
Development (DFID) 
  
Anne Bichsel Swiss Agency for 
Development and 
Cooperation 
Evaluation Officer anne.bichsel@deza.admin.ch 
Christoph Graf Swiss Agency for 
Development and 
Cooperation 
Head Controlling 
and Evaluation 
Division 
christoph.graf@deza.admin.ch 
Richard Gerster Gerster Consulting Director richard.gerster@gersterconsulting.
ch 
Roman 
Mogilevsky 
CASE-Kyrgyzstan Executive 
Director 
case@elcat.kg, 217947 
Aziz Atamanov CASE-Kyrgyzstan economist case@elcat.kg, 217947 
Julia Mironova CASE-Kyrgyzstan economist case@elcat.kg, 217947 
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Annex 5 
 
Official Development Assistance (ODA) to Central Asia 
 
Total Official Development Assistance (ODA), net disbursements, in USD millions 
(2000) 
   
Donor Kyrgyz-
stan 
Tajikistan Uzbekistan 
 
Kazakh-
stan 
Turkmeni- 
stan 
Total 
Japan 48  2 82 83  1 216 
US 25 23 36 58  8 150 
Germany  5  4 9   1  19 
Switzerland  7  5 1    13 
France   4  1    5 
UK  2  1  1    4 
Netherlands  2       2 
Sweden   2      2 
Spain     2    2 
Norway   1   1    2 
Other    1 36 13 16  66 
Total 
bilateral 
 91 38 134 159 10 432 
World Bank 52 23     75 
IMF 15 43     58 
EC 15 13 11  5  3  47 
Asian Dev. 
Bank 
21 12  1  4   38 
UNDP  2  2  1  1  1   7 
UNHCR  1  2  1  1  1   6 
WFP   5      5 
UNICEF  1  1  1  1  1   5 
IFAD  2    1    3 
EBRD     1    1 
Other   3  3  2  2   10 
Total 
multilateral 
112 104 17 15  6 254 
Other donor 
agencies 
 12  1 35 15 16  79 
Total  215 143 186 189 32 765 
 
Source: DAC, Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Aid Recipients 1996 – 
2000, OECD, Paris 2002 
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Annex 6: 
 
Overview Cooperation Portfolio Switzerland – Kyrgyz Republic 
(December 2002) 
 
 
Part A: Projects in the Kyrgyz Republic 
 
Economy 
Debt Management and Negotiation (seco) 
Aim: to help the MOFK and the Central Bank to develop and strengthen their capacities in the 
field of Debt Management 
Sector: Debt relief measures 
Swiss Contribution: CHF 0.9 mio 
Duration: 2002-2003 
Partner(s): IMF 
Budget Support – Co-financing of the Consolidated Structural Adjustment Credit (CSAC) 
(seco) 
Aim: the CSAC focuses on structural reforms to accelerate the transition form the plan to the 
market economy, some of the grant is general budget support, the rest is allocated to social 
protection measures 
Sector: Debt relief measures 
Swiss Contribution: CHF 8.75 mio 
Duration: 2002-2003 
Partner(s): WB 
Trade Facilitation Programme (TFP) (seco) 
Aim: to promote international and inter-regional trade 
Sector: Trade promotion 
Swiss Contribution: CHF 2.0 mio 
Duration: 2002-2003 
Partner(s): European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, EBRD 
Kyrgyz Republic Small and Medium-Sized Enterprise Finance facility (seco) 
Aim: to respond to the increasing demand for micro and small loan funding. 
Sector: Promotion of the private sector 
Swiss Contribution: USD 2.2 
Duration: 2002-2012 
Partner(s): European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, EBRD 
Support to Enterprises in Food- and Wood processing (SDC) 
Aim: to contribute to the support of the private sector in enabling SMES to produce profitably 
Sector: Private Sector 
Swiss Contribution: CHF 2.3 mio. 
Duration: 2001-2003 
Partner(s): Intercooperation, Helvetas 
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Support to MSMEs (SDC) 
Aim: to support potential MSMEs for further development. 
Sector: Private Sector 
Swiss Contribution: CHF 1.3 mio. 
Duration: 1999 to 2002 
Partner: SERVUS GmbH 
 
GIS/Land Registry Project (Consolidation Phase) (seco) 
Aim: to make better use the equipment supplied and the know-how provided during the first 
phase. 
Sector: Land registry 
Swiss Contribution: CHF 3.3 mio 
Duration: 2001 – 2003 
Partner(s): Ministry of Finance and Gos Cartography, Federal office of Topography 
Legal Advice for Rural Citizens (LARC) (SDC) 
Aim: to provide the population with information on their rights and to advise and support persons 
involved in court cases 
Sector: Governance, Security and Conflict Prevention 
Swiss Contribution: 1.86 Mio CHF 
Duration: 2002 to 2004 
Partner(s): Helvetas 
 
 
Environment/Energy 
Karakol Water Supply Project (seco) 
Aim: to have a secure and continuous supply of drinking water for the population. 
Sector: Water 
Swiss Contribution: CHF 10.3 mio 
Duration: 2002-2006 
Partner(s): City of Karakol 
Naryn III Substations Rehabilitation Project (seco) 
Aim: to improve the supply of electrical power in the region. 
Sector: Energy 
Swiss Contribution: CHF 7.6 
Duration: 2002-2005 
Partner(s): National Electricity Networks of Kyrgyzstan 
Dairy Siut Bulak (SDC) 
Aim: to make the dairy an independent, financially healthy and profit oriented enterprise 
Sector: Private Sector and Infrastructure 
Swiss Contribution: CHF 0.7 mio. 
Duration: 2001-2005 
Partner(s): Leuenberger Consulting 
 
 
Health/Social/Cultural 
Improvement of the Health Services in Naryn and Bishkek (SDC) 
Aim: to support the implementation of the national health reform programme 
Sector: Health 
Swiss Contribution: CHF 4.4 mio 
Duration: 2001-2004 
Partner(s): Ministry of Health of the Kyrgyz Republic, Swiss Red Cross 
Prevention of/Information regarding Sexually Transmitted Diseases (SDC) 
Aim: to decrease the spreading of sexually transmitted diseases in Osh 
Sector: Health/Social 
Swiss Contribution: CHF 0.5 mio 
Duration: 1999-2003 
Partner(s): Médecins sans Frontières, Paris 
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Rural Advisory Service (RAS) (SDC) 
Aim: To support farmers in developing sustainable livelihood systems. 
Sector: Natural Resources and Infrastructure 
Swiss Contribution: CHF 6.68 mio. 
Duration: 2002 to 2004 
Partner(s):Ministry of Agriculture and Water Resources, WB, IFAD, Helvetas 
Kyrgyz Swiss Forestry Programme (KIRFOR) (SDC) 
Aim: To support the development of a sustainable forestry sector 
Sector: Natural Resources and Infrastructure 
Swiss Contribution: CHF 4.6 mio. 
Duration: 2001 to 2003 
Partner(s):National Forestry Administration of the Kyrgyz Republic and Intercooperation 
Culture (SDC) 
Aim: to support the development of identity and to promote respect and tolerance 
Sector: Governance, Security and Conflict Prevention 
Swiss Contribution: CHF 0.5 mio. 
Duration: 2002 to 2005 
Partner(s):SDC self implemented with local partners 
 
 
Part B: Regional Projects 
 
Economy 
The Swiss-IFC Central Asia Partnership (PEP) (seco) 
Aim: to support the private sector in the region 
Sector: Promotion of the private sector (leasing sector, trade promotion, risk capital) 
Swiss Contribution: USD 4.3 mio 
Duration: 2001-2004 
Partner(s): International Finance Corporation 
Regional Export and Trade Promotion Central Asia (seco) 
Aim: to integrate the countries successfully in a multilateral trading system 
Sector: Promotion of trade 
Swiss Contribution: USD 1.5 mio. (phase 1) 
Duration: 2002-2003 
Partner(s): International Trade Center (ITC), Geneva 
Regional Debt Management Programme (seco) 
Aim: to deliver guidance and training to local staff 
Sector: Debt relief measures 
Swiss Contribution: CHF 4.7 mio 
Duration: 2002-2003 
Partner(s): IMF 
 
State/Education 
Workshop on questions in relation to the WTO (seco) 
Aim: to develop educational modules for negotiators in the WTO-negotiation process 
Sector: Economic politics, WTO 
Swiss Contribution: CHF 2 mio 
Duration: 2002-2004 
Partner(s): World Trade Institute, Berne 
Strengthening of Social research in Central Asia (SDC) 
Aim: to contribute to the reform and strengthening of social research in Central Asia 
Sector: Governance, Security and Conflict Prevention 
Swiss Contribution: CHF 0.4 mio 
Duration: 2000-2003 
Partner(s): WB 
Hydro-Meteorology (SDC) 
Aim: to train staff and strengthen institutions of the five national hydrometeorological services 
Sector: Natural Resources and Infrastructure 
Swiss Contribution: CHF 1.7 mio. 
Duration: 2001 to 2004 
Partner(s): Global Environmental facilities in the five countries 
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Environment/Energy 
Hydrometeorological Project (in the frame of the Aral Lake Programme) (SDC) 
Aim: to support the by the environmental catastrophe affected countries in dealing with 
environmental problems 
Sector: Environment/Water 
Swiss Contribution: CHF 3.5 mio 
Duration: 1994-2002 
Partner(s): The five national hydrometeorological services,Federal Office for Water and Geology 
Water management in the Ferghana-Valley (SDC) 
Aim: to identify possibilities for saving water and to improve the local water management 
services 
Sector: Natural Resources and Infrastructure 
Swiss Contribution: CHF 0.5 mio 
Duration: 2001-2003 
Partner(s): BVO Syr Darya (local organisation), Interstate Commission for Water Coordination, 
Scientific Information Centre, International Water Management Institute 
Central Asia Mountain Development Programme (SDC) 
Aim: to formulate strategies for the development of the alpine regions in Central Asia 
Sector: Natural Resources and Infrastructure 
Swiss Contribution: CHF 3.8 mio. 
Duration: 2003 to 2006 
Partner(s): Centre for Development and Environment 
 
 
Health/Social/Cultural 
Regional Media Programme (SDC) 
Aim: to provide practical training to local journalists with a view to improve the quality of the 
reporting 
Sector: Governance, Security and Conflict Prevention 
Swiss Contribution: CHF 0.9 mio. 
Duration: 2003 to 2005 
Partner(s): CIMERA 
Peace Building (Regional Dialogue and Development) (SDC) 
Aim: to promote mediation/negotiation in conflict situations and to rehabilitate the infrastructure 
Sector: Governance, Security and Conflict Prevention 
Swiss Contribution: CHF 4.8 mio. 
Duration: 2002 to 2004 
Partner(s): local NGOs, RRDP/UNDP 
 
